
As part of some research into “active defense“, I decided to review the actual text of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). This law has a number of well-documented problems, which I don’t plan to address in this post, partly because IANAL and partly because I want to focus on how the Act describes a “protected computer”:
the term “protected computer” means a computer—
(A) exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the United States Government, or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for such use, used by or for a financial institution or the United States Government and the conduct constituting the offense affects that use by or for the financial institution or the Government; or
(B) which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States
(Emphasis mine.) Specifically, I want to think about the implications related to a “computer located outside the United States”. Assuming that such a system doesn’t affect US commerce or communications (whether or not that activity takes place within the US), would it fall under the definition of a protected computer? For example, if a US person gains access to a command-and-control system in another country and takes some action that would otherwise certainly violate the CFAA were the C2 in the United States, perhaps the CFAA does not apply. Or maybe somebody accesses an exploit server or malware host to gather additional information: does the CFAA cover this? (Other statutes, particularly in the host country, may apply, so don’t do anything that might get you thrown in prison, kids. We’re just thinking about what the law may cover.)
Google may have possibly done something akin to this when investigating the Aurora incident. According to the New York Times story after the incident, Google:
…managed to gain access to a computer in Taiwan that it suspected of being the source of the attacks. Peering inside that machine, company engineers actually saw evidence of the aftermath of the attacks, not only at Google, but also at at least 33 other companies, including Adobe Systems, Northrop Grumman and Juniper Networks, according to a government consultant who has spoken with the investigators.
(Emphasis mine again.) So, according to this story, Google somehow accessed a system that presumably did not belong to them. Depending on that system’s function, perhaps this didn’t violate the CFAA. Certainly, the USSS or the Department of Justice or Secretary Clinton did not publicly express concern about this. As far as we know, they didn’t shut down the system or otherwise damage it, so while they could have concerns about Taiwanese law if they actually did any of this, they might not have to worry about the CFAA.
This post does not advocate so-called hack back retaliation, but my initial non-lawyerly analysis makes me wonder if other people already depend on this interpretation for various sorts of activities.









